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THE SCOPE OF CONSULAR IMMUNITY UNDER THE
VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR
RELATIONS: TOWARDS A PRINCIPLED
INTERPRETATION
INTRODUCTION
A consular officer, mistaken for a' trespasser as he leaves his mis-
sion to attend a cultural function, struggles with a police officer and is
subsequently charged with assault and battery.' The Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations 2 provides that consular officers3 are
immune from jurisdiction for "acts performed in the exercise of consu-
lar functions." 4 Does the Vienna Convention shield the consular of-
ficer from suit? The scope of consular immunity is uncertain because
courts differ in their application of the Convention's immunity rule.
This Note argues that a principled interpretation of the scope of
consular immunity consistent with the Vienna Convention requires a
functional approach, 5 based on whether immunity for the act giving
rise to suit is necessary for the performance of a recognized consular
function. Part I describes the Vienna Convention's treatment of consu-
lar immunity and examines the disparate standards courts and com-
mentators have applied in interpreting the scope of this immunity.
Part II argues that functional necessity is the legal basis of consular
immunity under the Convention and that the scope of the immunity
is defined by balancing the interests of sending and receiving states.
Part II further contends that previous standards are inconsistent with
this basis. Finally, Part III defines and applies a functional test of im-
munity derived from the Vienna Convention, illustrating its conso-
nance with both the theory and policy of the Convention.
1. These facts are drawn from Commonwealth v. Jerez, 390 Mass. 456, 457 N.E.2d
1105 (1983).
2. Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]. The United Nations Conference on Consular Relations adopted
the Vienna Convention on April 24, 1963, along with two optional protocols. At the end
of 1987, 116 states, including the United States, had ratified the Convention.
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Status as of December 31,
1987, at 72-73, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/6, U.N. Sales No. E.88.V.3 (1988).
3. The Vienna Convention defines "consular officer" as "any person, including the
head of a consular post, entrusted in that capacity with the exercise of consular func-
tions." Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. l(d).
4. Id. art. 43, 1.
5. This Note's use of the term "functional approach" should be distinguished from
that of Luke Lee, who employed it to describe the rule of customary international law
that consular officers are immune for acts performed in pursuance of their official func-
tions. See L. Lee, Consular Law and Practice 246-47 (1961).
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I. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF CONSULAR IMMUNITY
The Vienna Convention codified and progressively developed
customary international law6 on consular immunities. 7 As a party to
the Convention, the United States is bound by its terms, and its provi-
sions are part of United States law. While the Vienna Convention
grants consular officers immunity from the civil, criminal, and adminis-
trative jurisdiction of the receiving state for "acts performed in the ex-
ercise of consular functions," 8 this rule, by itself, has failed to provide
courts with sufficient guidance on the scope of the immunity granted
and has resulted in various interpretations.
A. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
In the pre-Convention era, the principle that consular officers were
immune only for their official acts-acts performed in the exercise of
consular functions 9-was so widely followed in bilateral conventions l0
and so widely accepted by both courts 1 and commentators1 2 that it was
recognized as a rule of customary international law.' 3 The Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, a product of the efforts of the
International Law Commission ("ILC") and the Vienna Conference on
6. "Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." Restatement (Revised) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (Tent. Final Draft 1985) [hereinaf-
ter Restatement (Revised)].
7. SeeJ. Zourek, Consular Intercourse and Immunities 34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/108
(1957), reprinted in [1957] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 71, 82, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1957/Add. 1.
8. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 43, T 1.
9. The terms "official acts" and "acts performed in the exercise of consular func-
tions" have been used interchangeably by courts and commentators, see Y. Dinstein,
Consular Immunity From Judicial Process 25 (1966), and the International Law Com-
mission, see Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
[hereinafter Report of the ILC], 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 29, art. 43, comment 2,
U.N. Doc. A/4843 (1961), reprinted in [1961] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 88, 117, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1961/Add.1. However, the latter term is more precise because not all
official acts, for example those specific to diplomatic functions, can be performed by
consular officers.
10. For a list of such conventions, seeJ. Zourek, supra note 7, at 82, reprinted in
[1957] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 7, at 99.
11. See, e.g., Lyders v. Lund, 32 F.2d 308, 309 (N.D. Cal. 1929) (consular officers
are immune from suits "based upon official, authorized acts, performed within the scope
of their duties on behalf of the foreign state"); Arcaya v. Paez, 145 F. Supp. 464, 470-71
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (acts of consular officer in publicizing unfavorable articles about exiled
national of sending state not within scope of official duties, thus no immunity from libel
suit), aff'd, 244 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1957).
12. See, e.g., L. Oppenheim, 1 International Law § 435 (1955); see also Beckett,
Consular Immunities, 21 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 34, 47 (1941) (citing authorities).
13. Report of the ILC, supra note 9, at 29, art. 43, comment 2, reprinted in [1961]
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 9, at 117.
CONSULAR IMMUNITY
Consular Relations,' 4 codified international law on consular immuni-
ties by providing:
Consular officers and consular employees shall not be amena-
ble to the jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative authori-
ties of the receiving State in respect of acts performed in the
exercise of consular functions. 15
In codifying the "consular functions" principle, the Vienna
Convention maintained the basic difference between consular and dip-
lomatic' 6 immunities: "consular personnel enjoy immunity from legal
process only in respect of official acts, whereas diplomatic agents have
full personal inviolability and immunity from legal process."'
7
The more limited scope of consular immunity is reflected in the
structure of the Vienna Convention and illustrated by comparison with
the Diplomatic Convention. While both conventions provide that "it is
the duty of all persons enjoying ... privileges and immunities to re-
spect the laws and regulations of the receiving State," and "not to in-
terfere in the internal affairs of that State,"' 8 laws and regulations
cannot be judicially enforced against diplomatic agents because they
enjoy complete criminal immunity, and complete civil and administra-
tive immunity except insofar as they engage in a limited number of ac-
tivities.' 9 In contrast, the duty of consular officers to respect receiving-
state laws is judicially enforceable in all cases, except where article 43
14. For an account of developments leading to the signing of the Vienna
Convention, see Nascimento e Silva, The Vienna Conference on Consular Relations, 13
Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 1214, 1214-20 (1964).
15. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 43, 1. The Convention allows other
international agreements to provide for greater immunity. Id. art. 73, $ 2. Most notable
among such agreements is the Consular Convention, June 1, 1964, United States-Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, 19 U.S.T. 5018, T.I.A.S. No. 6503, which provides for
complete immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state. Id. art. 19, 2.
16. Diplomatic immunities are codified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, Apr. 16, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinaf-
ter Diplomatic Convention].
17. Restatement (Revised), supra note 6, § 463 Reporters' Note 1; see also id. at
comment a (providing further comparison).
18. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 55, 1; Diplomatic Convention, supra
note 16, art. 41, $ 1. In each case, the full text is:
Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all per-
sons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regula-
tions of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the
internal affairs of that State.
Id.
19. Diplomatic Convention, supra note 16, art. 31, T 1. Diplomatic agents are not
immune from civil and administrative jurisdiction in:
(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory
of the receiving State ... ; (b) an action relating to succession in which the
diplomatic agent is involved.., as a private person... ; (c) an action relating to
any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the
receiving State outside his official functions.
1988] 843
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grants immunity for acts performed in the exercise of consular
functions.
Because consular immunity attaches only to official acts, an
important issue for the drafters of the Vienna Convention was how, and
indeed whether, to codify consular functions.20 Eventually, the drafters
recognized that if immunity depended upon whether an act was per-
formed in the exercise of consular functions, it was vital that courts be
able to determine the functions to which immunity would apply.2 1
Article 5, a nonexhaustive list of the most important consular func-
tions, 22 emerged after lengthy debate among both members of the
20. See L. Lee, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 51 (1966). The primary
source of dispute was whether to adopt a general or enumerative definition of consular
functions. See id. at 52-53 (outlining principal arguments).
21. See United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, 1 Official Records 126,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/16, U.N. Sales No. 63.X.2 (1963) [hereinafter Official Records]
(statement of Mr. Kirchschlaeger (Austria)) (arguing that it is "of the greatest impor-
tance" that "courts of the receiving State ... be able to ascertain ... from an interna-
tional convention" the consular functions to which immunity applies).
22. Article 5 provides
Consular functions consist in:
(a) protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its
nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, within the limits permitted by
international law;
(b) furthering the development of commercial, economic, cultural and scien-
tific relations between the sending State and the receiving State and otherwise
promoting friendly relations between them in accordance with the provisions of
the present Convention;
(c) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the com-
mercial, economic, cultural and scientific life of the receiving State, reporting
thereon to the Government of the sending State and giving information to per-
sons interested;
(d) issuing passports and travel documents to nationals of the sending State,
and visas or appropriate documents to persons wishing to travel to the sending
State;
(e) helping and assisting nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, of
the sending State;
(0 acting as notary and civil registrar and in capacities of a similar kind, and
performing certain functions of an administrative nature, provided that there is
nothing contrary thereto in the laws and regulations of the receiving State;
(g) safeguarding the interests of nationals, both individuals and bodies corpo-
rate, of the sending State in cases of succession mortis causa in the territory of
the receiving State, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State;
(h) safeguarding, within the limits imposed by the laws and regulations of the
receiving State, the interests of minors and other persons lacking full capacity
who are nationals of the sending State, particularly where any guardianship or
trusteeship is required with respect to such persons;
(i) subject to the practices and procedures obtaining in the receiving State,
representing or arranging appropriate representation for nationals of the send-
ing State before the tribunals and other authorities of the receiving State, for
the purpose of obtaining, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State, provisional measures for the preservation of the rights and in-
844 [Vol. 88:841
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ILC23 and conferees to the Vienna Conference 24 as a compromise be-
tween a general definition and a specific enumeration. 25 Problems of
interpretation generally arise as to what acts are "performed in the ex-
ercise" of the functions listed.
B. Standards of Interpretation
While the immunity rule of the Vienna Convention mandates a dis-
tinction between consular and diplomatic immunities, it does not, with-
out more, unambiguously delimit the scope of consular immunity.
Conflicting interpretations, by both courts and commentators, create
uncertainty for both consular officers and the receiving-state nationals
who deal with them.
1. Broad Interpretations. - Since the signing of the Vienna
Convention, some courts have interpreted consular immunity broadly
in both civil26 and criminal27 contexts. These courts have given gener-
ous readings to both of the provisions of the Vienna Convention that
must be invoked to establish immunity: the list of consular functions in
article 5 and the immunity rule of article 43.
One court has read article 5(m), the catch-all definition of consular
terests of these nationals, where, because of absence or any other reason, such
nationals are unable at the proper time to assume the defence of their rights
and interests;
(j) transmittingjudicial and extra-judicial documents or executing letters roga-
tory or commissions to take evidence for the courts of the sending State in
accordance with international agreements in force or, in the absence of such
international agreenlents, in any other manner compatible with the laws and
regulations of the receiving State;
(k) exercising rights of supervision and inspection provided for in the laws and
regulations of the sending State in respect of vessels having the nationality of
the sending State, and of aircraft registered in that State, and in respect of their
crews;
(1) extending assistance to vessels and aircraft mentioned in subparagraph (k)
of this Article and to their crews, taking statements regarding the voyage of a
vessel, examining and stamping the ship's papers, and, without prejudice to the
powers of the authorities of the receiving State, conducting investigations into
any irncidents which occurred during the voyage, and settling disputes of any
kind between the master, the officers and the seamen in so far as this may be
authorized by the laws and regulations of the sending State;
(m) performing any other functions entrusted to a consular post by the send-
ing State which are not prohibited by the laws and regulations of the receiving
State or to which no objection is taken by the receiving State or which are re-
ferred to in the international agreements in force between the sending State
and the receiving State.
23. See Report of the ILC, supra note 9, at 8-9, art. 5, comments 1-6, reprinted in
[1961] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 9, at 96.
24. See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
25. L. Lee, supra note 20, at 51.
26. See Heaney v. Spain, 445 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1971).
27. See Commonwealth v. Jerez, 390 Mass. 456, 457 N.E.2d 1105 (1983).
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functions, 28 to operate as a broad license to engage in activities under
the protection of immunity. In Heaney v. Spain,29 the Second Circuit
held that contracting with United States citizens to disseminate adverse
publicity about a foreign government was compatible with the exercise
of consular functions, finding "nothing which would suggest that these
alleged activities would not be embraced by the catch-all definition."30
Therefore, the consular officer was immune from suit for breach of
contract.
Another court expanded the scope of immunity by implicitly inter-
preting the phrase "in the exercise of consular functions" in article 43
to mean during such exercise, focusing scrutiny solely on the temporal
connection between the act and the function. If a function is recog-
nized under article 5, immunity attaches to any act committed during
that function's exercise. In Commonwealth v. Jerez,3i the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts appeared to follow this analysis in hold-
ing that a consular officer was immune from suit for assault and battery
committed on a police officer as he proceeded to a cultural gathering.
3 2
Furthermore, Jerez read narrowly language in the Vienna
Convention that might have distinguished the conduct in question from
consular functions recognized by article 5. The court found that the
duty to respect the laws of the receiving state under article 55 " 'cannot
be construed to mean that the doing of a single illegal act takes the
activity outside the scope of the consular functions except where specif-
ically so provided in article 5.'-"3 Therefore, the court reasoned that
the consular officer's alleged "single illegal act" of assaulting a police-
man did not take his activity outside the scope of consular functions.
3 4
2. Narrow Interpretations. - One California appellate court held that
"the manner in which... an authorized function was carried out deter-
mine[d] whether [it] was in fact rendered within the scope of consular
duties."'35 Literally applied, this standard bases the legitimacy of a con-
sular function on the means chosen to perform it. Where the means
are suspect, the ultimate activity is rendered outside the scope of con-
sular functions and immunity is lost.
A restrictive interpretation also has been reached by focusing on
28. See supra note 22.
29. 445 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1971).
30. Id. at 505.
31. 390 Mass. 456, 457 N.E.2d 1105 (1983).
32. Id. at 458-59, 457 N.E.2d at 1106-07.
33. Id. at 461,457 N.E.2d at 1108 (quoting Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. Salamie,
54 Ill. App. 3d 465, 474, 369 N.E.2d 235, 241 (1977)). The Salamie court reached this
conclusion because article 55 provides that the duty to respect the laws of the receiving
state is "'without prejudice to [consular officers'] privileges and immunities.'" Salamie,
54 Ill. App. 3d at 474, 369 N.E.2d at 241 (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art.
55, 1).
34. Jerez, 390 Mass. at 461, 457 N.E.2d at 1108.
35. Silva v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. App. 3d 269, 280, 125 Cal. Rptr. 78, 87 (1975).
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the international law principle of noninterference expressed in article
55 of the Vienna Convention.36 In Gerritsen v. de la Madrid Hurtado,
37
the Ninth Circuit held that the action of a consular officer who forcibly
silenced a demonstrator outside his consulate constituted an "interfer-
ence with the United States' internal affairs" and thus was not "within
the limits permitted by international law." s38 Therefore, his action
could not properly be protected by the Convention as a consular func-
tion.3 9 Under such an approach, presumably any consular activity that
adversely affects the interests of the receiving state or its nationals is
suspect as an interference in the receiving state's internal affairs.
3. Alternatives. - Commentators have attempted bright-line an-
swers to consular immunity questions, such as distinguishing official
from nonofficial acts on the ground that the former are "performed
under the authority and on behalf of a State by one of its organs ... so
that the act can be imputed to it and deemed an 'act of State.' "40 One
writer has suggested expanding the length and detail of the list of con-
sular functions in the Vienna Convention so that the immunity
attaching to the exercise of these functions would be more clearly de-
fined.4 1 Another has proposed that courts apply a "substantial depar-
ture" test, whereby a substantial departure from an act a consular
officer is required to perform indicates that he is acting outside his offi-
cial duties and therefore not entitled to immunity.42 Finally, both
courts43 and commentators 44 have suggested a political solution to the
problem, which would remove responsibility for immunity determina-
tions from the courts and place it with the State Department.
II. THE THEORETICAL, POLICY, AND STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK OF
IMMUNITY UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION
The text and preparatory work of the Vienna Convention demon-
strate that functional necessity was intended to be the basis of consular
36. See supra note 18.
37. 819 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987).
38. Id. at 1516.
39. Id.
40. Y. Dinstein, supra note 9, at 23. Dinstein labels acts performed in the course of
an official assignment, but not attributable to the state (such as negligent driving) or acts
which he argues are consular but not official (such as representing a national in the
administration of an estate) "semi-official." He argues that semi-official acts do not ex-
empt the consular officer from judicial process. Id. at 62.
41. See Green, European Convention on Consular Functions: A Contribution by
the Council of Europe to the Development of International Law, 8 Revue Belge de Droit
International 176, 187 (1972) (preferring the European Convention on Consular Func-
tions' highly detailed list of consular functions over the Vienna Convention's list).
42. L. Lee, supra note 20, at 122-23.
43. See Heaney v. Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 505 (2d Cir. 1971); Arcaya v. Paez, 145 F.
Supp. 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1957).




immunity. The scope of immunity based on functional necessity is de-
termined by balancing the interests of the sending and receiving states,
an underlying policy of the Vienna Convention with which previous in-
terpretations of the Convention are not in accord.
A. Functional Necessity
In modern times, functional necessity has gained widespread ac-
ceptance as the theoretical basis of both diplomatic and consular immu-
nities.45 The functional necessity theory rests on the premise that
without protection from legal and political interference by the receiving
state, agents in international relations would be largely at the mercy of
their host governments for the degree to which they could fulfill their
duties. The threat of such interference alone could "materially hamper
them in the exercise of their functions."' 46 Today it is generally agreed
that consular immunities exist because "it is essential for the proper
discharge of consular duties that a consul should be immune from pro-
cess in the local courts in respect of them."
'47
The Vienna Convention explicitly adopts the functional necessity
theory of consular immunity in its preamble, which states that "the pur-
pose of... privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to
ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular posts on be-
half of their respective States."'48 The preparatory work of the Vienna
Convention confirms what appears from the face of the text: the dele-
gates to the Conference intended the immunity to safeguard the consu-
lar process from unwarranted interference. The delegate who
introduced the preamble containing the above phrase stated that "[t]he
paragraph expresse[s] the so-called principle of functional necessity
which [is] an essential attribute of consular privileges and immuni-
ties." 49 Comments of other delegates confirm the intention to recog-
nize functional necessity as the basis of consular immunity.50
Nonetheless, the exact contours of consular immunity based on
45. See Note, Consular Immunity From Service of Process Under the Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations, 8 Fordham Int'l L.J. 96, 101 (1984) ("The functional
necessity theory has, in fact, generally governed the privileges and immunities enjoyed
by consular representatives."); see also L. Henkin, R. Pugh, 0. Schacter & H. Smit, In-
ternational Law: Cases and Materials 948 (2d ed. 1987) (citing authorities).
46. B. Sen, A Diplomat's Handbook of International Law and Practice 82 (1979).
47. Beckett, supra note 12, at 49. But see Y. Dinstein, supra note 9, at 21-23 (argu-
ing that concern for the proper performance of consular functions cannot explain why
the immunity applies only to certain acts, because the limited legal and psychological
protection the immunity provides is insufficient to ensure unhampered performance of
consular functions).
48. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, preamble, 5.
49. 1 Official Records, supra note 21, at 246 (statement of Mr. Rao (India)).
50. See id. at 248 (statement of Mr. Ustor (Hungary)) (supporting fifth paragraph
of the preamble because it clearly specifies functional necessity as "the one certain ba-
sis" of consular immunity); id. at 247 (statement of Mr. Heppel (United Kingdom)).
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functional necessity, or "functional immunity," are not readily appar-
ent. For example, in the extreme, functional immunity could mean
complete immunity, since only complete immunity could absolutely en-
sure that a consular officer's functions would be unimpeded by the re-
ceiving state.5 1 At the other extreme, functional immunity could mean
nothing more than protection of consular officers from politically moti-
vated acts by the receiving state designed to limit the scope of consular
authority; the consular officer would then remain amenable to suit for
the slightest deviation from authorized conduct. In short, without fur-
ther definition, the concept of functional immunity for consular officers
is subject to the same vagaries of interpretation as the consular func-
tions rule that attempts to effectuate it.
B. Balancing Interests
The text, preparatory work, and overall structure of key provisions
of the Vienna Convention show that the drafters and conferees in-
tended to balance sending- and receiving-state interests. This balanc-
ing provides a means to determine the scope of functional consular
immunity.
1. Policy. - Consular immunity is part of customary international
law. 52 Early twentieth century commentary indicates that the scope of
consular immunity has long been viewed as the result of a competition
between the interests of sending and receiving states. This commen-
tary explains that consular officers perform duties solely for the benefit
of the sending state and its nationals in the territory of the receiving
state.55 As such, the sending state's interests are furthered by the
existence of consular immunities, which allows the successful and un-
hindered performance of these duties. 5 4 On the other hand, because
"[c]onsular rights and prerogatives [are] in derogation of the territorial
jurisdiction of the receiving State," 55 it is in the receiving state's inter-
est to have these immunities interpreted restrictively. 5 6 Nonetheless,
"It]he receiving state acquiesces in slight qualifications of its territorial
authority in order that it may be permitted to establish consular offices
abroad in its own interests."
57
The Vienna Convention, which codified and progressively devel-
oped international law on consular immunities,5 8 reflects a similar ac-
51. See Y. Dinstein, supra note 9, at 21-23.
52. Report of the ILC, supra note 9, at 29, art. 43, comment 2, reprinted in [1961]
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 9, at 117.
53. See Harvard Law School, The Legal Position and Functions of Consuls, in Re-
search in International Law 189, 214-15 (1932).
54. See id.
55. J. Puente, The Foreign Consul: His Juridical Status in the United States 35
(1926).
56. See id.
57. The Legal Position and Functions of Consuls, supra note 53, at 214.
58. See supra note 7.
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commodation of these competing interests. Article 5, the list of
consular functions, is composed of both general functions,59 which
identify the essential purposes of a consular officer's duties, such as
"protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and
of its nationals," 60 and a series of more specific means to these ends,
6'
such as acting as a notary,62 or representing sending-state nationals
before tribunals and authorities in the receiving state. 63 These more
specific functions implicate receiving-state interests and are therefore
generally subject to regulation or prohibition. This dichotomy between
a class of general principles and a list of more specific functions imple-
ments a balance of interests by allowing the receiving state to regulate
the exercise of specific functions, provided it does not thereby under-
mine the essential functions at the heart of the consular process.
The preparatory work of the Convention provides additional evi-
dence that the drafters and conferees considered competing interests in
drafting article 5. At the Vienna Conference, a debate developed over
whether to adopt a general or enumerative definition of consular func-
tions. The article 5 issue, which the ILC had resolved in its draft arti-
cles in favor of a nonexhaustive enumeration set out by way of
example,64 was thrown open by a proposed amendment calling for a
general definition. 65 The conferees invited Jaroslav Zourek, Special
Rapporteur of the ILC,66 to explain why the ILC had adopted the enu-
merative text. He responded that consular functions could not be de-
fined solely in general terms because the legal basis for their exercise is
not uniform.67 In particular, he stated:
Certain consular functions [are] based on customary interna-
tional law and [have] been established for centuries. Others,
however, [have] emerged in more recent times. It was clear to
the International Law Commission that the exercise of those
consular functions which [are] based on customary interna-
59. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(a)-(c).
60. Id. art 5(a). ILC commentary identifies this as "the most important of the many
consular functions." Report of the ILC, supra note 9, at 9, art. 5, comment 7, reprinted
in [1961] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 9, at 96.
61. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(d)-(/).
62. Id. art. 5(f).
63. Id. art. 5(i).
64. Report of the ILC, supra note 9, at 8-9, art. 5, comment 6, reprinted in [1961] 2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 9, at 96.
65. See generally 1 Official Records, supra note 21, at 124-34 (record of debate).
66. Zourek was appointed Special Rapporteur in 1955, when the ILC began the
study of consular intercourse and immunities. He submitted three reports to the ILC,
including 60 draft articles, U.N. Docs. A/CN.4/108 (1957), A/CN.4/131 (1960),
A/CN.4/137 (1961), which served as the basis for the ILC's discussion and led to its
Draft Articles on Consular Intercourse and Immunities. See Report of the ILC, supra
note 9, at 2-3, reprinted in [1961] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 9, at 89-90. The
ILC's Draft Articles were in turn used as the working draft at the Vienna Conference.




tional law could under no circumstances be prevented by the
receiving State. With respect to other functions, however, the
position was that a consul could exercise them if they were
entrusted to him by the sending State and if their exercise was
not forbidden by the authorities of the receiving State.68
Subsequent to Zourek's comments, the conferees added saving
clauses to four subparagraphs, 69 expressly subjecting the exercise of
each function listed therein to the laws of the receiving state. This ac-
tion explicitly assigned these functions to Zourek's second category,
those whose exercise depends upon acquiescence by both the sending
and receiving states.
Also noteworthy is an amendment proposed by Austria that would
have left largely unchanged the substantive list of consular functions in
article 5, but would have separated the article into two paragraphs:
main functions and implementing functions. 70 Interestingly, this con-
ceptual division corresponds to the dichotomy between general func-
tions, subparagraphs (a) through (c), and specific functions, sub-
paragraphs (d) through (1), apphrent from the text. It also received
substantial support at the Conference, 71 including a comment by one
delegate that it "reflected the original intention of the International
Law Commission. ' ' 72 While the amendment was never voted on and
thus not incorporated into the final draft, the episode suggests that the
conferees believed that article 5 as amended by the addition of saving
clauses 73 already reflected the division of functions, and thus the com-
68. Id. at 134. Zourek listed the following as examples of functions that could not
be prevented by the receiving state: protecting the interests of the sending state and its
nationals; promoting the development of friendly relations between the two states; as-
certaining conditions in the receiving state; issuing passports; assisting nationals; and
safeguarding their rights in estates. An example of a function that could only be exer-
cised if it did not conflict with receiving-state laws is solemnizing marriages. Id. at 135.
69. The subparagraphs are (f), (g), (h) and (i). Id. at 150-59. The clause "subject
to the practices and procedures obtaining in the receiving State" was added to subpara-
graph (i), which already contained a saving clause as drafted by the ILC. Id. at 156-59.
In addition, a catch-all subparagraph, (m), which also contained a saving clause, was
added. Id. at 164-66.
70. 2 id. at 56-57, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/C.1/L.26 (1963). The amendment would
also have listed two additional implementing functions. See id. For a record of the
Vienna Conference's consideration of the amendment, see 1 id. at 147-48, 166-67.
71. See, e.g., id. at 147 (statement of Mr. von Haeften (Federal Republic of Ger-
many)) (supporting the amendment because it "would help future readers to understand
the arrangement not only of article 5, but of the convention as a whole"); id. at 148
(statements of Messrs. Wu (China), Palierakis (Greece), Marambio (Chile), Westrup
(Sweden) and other supporters). But see id. (statement of Mr. Martins (Portugal)).
72. Id. at 148 (statement of Mr. Wu (China)).
73. The importance of the amendment was particularly lessened by the adoption of
the catch-all definition of consular functions in article 5(m). The delegate who proposed
the amendment stated that "as a result of the joint amendment just adopted [adding
subparagraph (in)], the Austrian amendment... modifying the structure of the article




peting interests, of which Zourek spoke,
In addition to the composition of article 5, the Vienna
Convention's treatment of the essential function of protecting the in-
terests of the sending state and of its nationals, at once both regulated
and protected by the proviso that the function must be exercised
"within the limits permitted by international law,"'74 is itself illustrative
of the balancing of competing interests. The qualification serves as a
check on sending-state power, 75 while reinforcing the existence of es-
sential functions as general principles of international law.
7 6
2. Structure. - The balance struck in article 5 between sending-
and receiving-state interests is evident in the overall structure of the
Vienna Convention as well. The interplay between articles of the Con-
vention carefully counters a consular officer's duties toward the receiv-
ing state with immunities from its jurisdiction.
Article 55 sets out "the fundamental rule" 77 that it is each consular
officer's duty "to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving
State."78 This rule, which appears in the Diplomatic Convention as
well,7 9 is particularly significant in regard to consular relations since it
provides "a sufficient safeguard for the receiving State" because "con-
suls, unlike diplomatic agents, [are] subject to the jurisdiction of the
receiving State. If, therefore, they violate[] its laws and regulations, the
receiving State [is] in a position to enforce observance." 8 0 At the same
time, however, the sending state's competing interest in being free
from the enforcement of laws that interfere with the consular process is
satisfied by the immunity rule of article 43, which shields consular of-
ficers from receiving-state jurisdiction for acts performed in the exer-
cise of consular functions.
Thus, through the interplay of these two articles, the laws and reg-
ulations of the receiving state, which a consular officer must respect,
74. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(a).
75. The proviso "within the limits permitted by international law" was borrowed
from the Diplomatic Convention, supra note 16, art. 3, 1(b). See Summary Records of
the Thirteenth Session, [1961] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 20, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1961. Delegates to the Diplomatic Conference supported adding the
clause in order to curb abuses by explicitly stating that there are limits to the right of
protection. See United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities,
1 Official Records 79-82, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.20/14, U.N. Sales No. 61.X.2 (1961).
76. The proviso can be read as a safeguard against restrictive receiving-state legis-
lation, not itself in conformity with international law, that prevents a consular officer
from justly intervening on behalf of the sending state. It was so read by at least one
member of the ILC. See Summary Records of the Thirteenth Session, (1961] 1 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 75, at 19 (statement of Mr. Ago (Italy)).
77. Report of the ILC, supra note 9, at 35, art. 55, comment 1, reprinted in [1961]
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 9, at 123.
78. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 55, 1.
79. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.




govern all aspects of the officer's conduct in the receiving state, except
insofar as immunity exempts him from their enforcement. In contrast,
the "laws and regulations" referred to in the saving clauses of article 5
govern only the exercise of specific consular functions.
Therefore, in civil and criminal actions not.involving the violation
of a law that regulates the exercise of a consular function, for example,
a libel suit or criminal prosecution for assault, itis not sufficient to find
immunity from the mere fact that no provision in article 5 removes the
act from consular functions;8 1 the duty under article 55 remains, en-
forceable unless immunity is provided by article 43.
In criminal cases, article 41 supplements the system of checks and
balances established in the Convention. This article provides that
"[c]onsular officers shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending
trial, except in the case of a grave crime." 8 2 As the ILC noted, "[t]he
arrest of a consular official hampers considerably the functioning of the
consulate and the discharge of [its] daily tasks" and thereby "harm[s]
the interests" of both the sending and receiving states and "seriously
affect[s] consular relations between the two States." 8 3 Therefore, the
personal inviolability granted under article 41 provides a significant
counterbalance to any potential dangers deriving from the enforceable
duty to respect the laws of the receiving state.
C. Prior Standards
None of the standards of interpretation heretofore applied by the
courts is sufficiently attentive to the Convention's underlying premise
that sending- and receiving-state interests must be balanced. Unduly
broad8 4 and narrow8 5 interpretations threaten receiving- and sending-
state interests, respectively, and fail to recognize the functional basis of
consular immunity.
The broad strain of interpretation represented by Commonwealth v.
81. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
82. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 41, 1.
In the United States, courts can be expected to interpret "grave crime" to mean a
felony. Letter of Submittal from the Department of State to the President, S. Exec. Doc.
E, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. vi (1969). It should be noted that this provision does not mean
that consular officers can be prosecuted only for grave crimes, but rather that in the case
of a lesser offense, they cannot be imprisoned until convicted. See id.; see also Report
of the ILC, supra note 9, at 28, art. 41, comment 13, reprinted in [1961] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n, supra note 9, at 116. ("Paragraph 1 of this article refers to immunity from
arrest and detention pending trial.... It should be pointed out that this paragraph by no
means excludes the institution of criminal proceedings against a consular official.") (em-
phasis added).
83. Report of the ILC, supra note 9, at 28, art. 41, comment 13, reprinted in [1961J
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 9, at 116.
84. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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Jerez86 is inappropriate in two respects. First, granting immunity for all
acts performed during the exercise of consular functions was not con-
templated by the drafters of the Convention.8 7 Therefore, the fact that
Jerez was on his way to a cultural affair at the time of the incident does
not, without more, conclusively establish that he was entitled to
immunity.
Second, the Jerez court misunderstood the interplay between
articles 5 and 55. Because Jerez was en route to a cultural gathering,
the court reasonably concluded that the object of his behavior was the
legitimate consular function of "furthering the development of... cul-
tural ... relations"88 between the sending and receiving states pursu-
ant to article 5(b).8 9 Yet because article 5(b) contains no clause
subjecting the exercise of that function to the laws of the receiving
state, the court searched in vain for a "specific provision of article 5...
which takes Jerez's alleged assault and battery outside the scope of his
consular functions." 90 Finding none, the court concluded that Jerez
was immune. But the absence of saving clauses in particular provisions
of article 5 means that the receiving state cannot prevent the exercise of
essential functions through excessively restrictive regulation, not that
the duty to respect the laws of the receiving state does not apply.9 1
Therefore, since assault and battery is incompatible with the exercise of
consular functions, Jerez is actually not immune under the Vienna Con-
vention's immunity rule, and the laws of the receiving state can be en-
forced against him.
The difficulty with the result inJerez is further demonstrated by the
inconsistent results its rationale would bring about. If, for example,
Jerez had been on his way to perform an administrative function, under
the court's reasoning he would not enjoy immunity for the alleged as-
sault and battery because article 5(f), governing administrative func-
86. 390 Mass. 456,457 N.E.2d 1105 (1983); see supra notes 31-34 and accompany-
ing text.
87. This is evident from comments made in regard to the adoption of paragraph
2(b) of article 43, which provides that the consular functions immunity rule "shall not,
however, apply in respect of a civil action ... by a third party for damage arising from an
accident in the receiving State caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft." Vienna Conven-
tion, supra note 2, art. 43, 2. It might be argued that creating this exception to immu-
nity for an act that often would occur during the performance of consular functions
proves the rule that immunity generally attaches to such acts. However, remarks made
during debate over the inclusion of this paragraph dispel that notion. The sponsor of
this provision "agreed that the act of driving a motor-car should not be regarded as
constituting the performance of a consular function for the purpose of claiming immu-
nity from jurisdiction, but [the] amendment was necessary to put the matter beyond
doubt." I Official Records, supra note 21, at 375 (statement of Mr. Evans (United
Kingdom)).
88. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(b).
89. 390 Mass. at 458-59, 457 N.E.2d at 1106-07.
90. Id. at 461, 457 N.E.2d at 1108.
91. See supra notes 68-69, 77-81, and accompanying text.
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tions, contains a saving clause. Nothing in the text or preparatory work
of the Convention suggests that such a distinction should be meaning-
ful in immunity determinations.
An expansive view of conduct recognized as consular functions
under the catch-all definition in article 5(m), such as the Heaney v.
Spain92 court took, may disrupt the balance of interests attained
throughout the article and the Vienna Convention as a whole. The
Heaney court's interpretation of article 5(m) to include contracting to
disseminate adverse publicity about a foreign government, 93 an activity
readily distinguishable from the specific consular functions expressly
listed, protects conduct arguably well removed from the consular pro-
cess, thereby slighting both the explicit recognition of receiving-state
interests in that article and the functional necessity principle on which
immunity under the Convention is based.
On the other hand, narrow interpretations place inadequate em-
phasis on the interests of the sending state. The scope of a consular
officer's functional immunity cannot be so narrow as to shield him only
if he performs his duties faultlessly. If the language of Silva v. Superior
Court9 4 implies that to exercise a function improperly is to exceed its
bounds, it threatens the doctrine of immunity, 95 rendering the protec-
tion provided illusory.
Similarly, the approach taken by the Gerritsen v. de la Madrid
Hurtado96 court, which based its immunity determination on a novel
reading of the principle that consular officers have a duty not to inter-
fere in the internal affairs of the receiving state,97 threatens the con-
sular process and sending-state interests therein. Although the result
in Gerritsen is readily defensible-surely consular officers do not need
immunity for forcibly silencing protestors outside their missions in or-
der to protect the interests of the sending state-Gerritsen's equation of
striking a protestor and confiscating his leaflets with "interference with
the United States' internal affairs"9 8 unduly extends the boundaries of
the noninterference principle. 99 If interference in internal affairs is
read broadly, such legitimate consular activities as gathering and
92. 445 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1971); see supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
93. See id.
94. 52 Cal. App. 3d 269, 125 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1975); see supra note 35 and accompa-
nying text.
95. Waltier v. Thomson, 189 F. Supp. 319, 321 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
96. 819 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987); see supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
97. See id. at 1516.
98. Id.
99. Exploration of the principle of noninterference in international law is beyond
the scope of this Note. However, it has been argued that this principle condemns state-
level interference with the political processes or governmental functions of a foreign
state, such as involvement in elections or illicit attempts to influence the policymaking
process. See B. Sen, supra note 46, at 75-77.
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reporting information on conditions in the receiving state, 100 for exam-
ple, might be considered interference. Thus, the Gerritsen rationale
might be used as a pretext for improperly restricting the scope of con-
sular functions.
Other proposed solutions to clarifying the scope of immunity, such
as distinguishing official from nonofficial acts, 10 redrafting article 5,102
or applying a "substantial departure" test,103 though not intrinsically
prejudicial toward either sending- or receiving-state interests, fail to
provide courts with workable standards of interpretation. These pro-
posals either fail to define the boundaries of acceptable consular con-
duct to which immunity should attach,10 4 or ignore the functional basis
of consular immunity. 0 5
Finally, resolving immunity issues on a political level rather than in
the courts is untenable. The Vienna Convention's codification of inter-
national law in a binding legal instrument presumes that impartial
tribunals 106 will interpret consular immunity consistently, unaffected by
changing political winds and without regard to the current state of bi-
lateral relations between the states involved. Political case-by-case res-
olution was rejected by the ILC as a usurpation of the judicial function
100. See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(c).
101. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
104. As the ILC itself recognized, it will be "very difficult" to distinguish official
from nonofficial acts. Report of the ILC, supra note 9, at 29, art. 43, comment 3, re-
printed in [1961] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 9, at 117. A test based on this
distinction also suffers from circularity: it simply restates the immunity rule of article 43.
Expanding the length and detail of consular functions in article 5 may eliminate
uncertainty in some situations, but as the cases illustrate, the difficulty with the immunity
rule often lies not in determining whether a legitimate consular function is involved, but
whether a suspect act is "performed in the exercise" of that function. See, e.g., Com-
monwealth v.Jerez, 390 Mass. 456, 457 N.E.2d 1105 (1983); Waltier v. Thomson, 189 F.
Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
The "substantial departure" test has been criticized as being "rather vague and very
general, inspiring little certainty as to how a court would apply it to a specific set of
facts." Note, supra note 44, at 678. Since each court is likely to have a different view of
what constitutes "substantial," this test would provide little consistency in determining
the scope of immunity. A court applying this test would still have to balance the inter-
ests of the sending and receiving states in order to arrive at a principled interpretation.
105. A proponent of the official/nonofficial act test bases its legitimacy on asser-
tions made prior to the Vienna Convention that consular acts deserve immunity because
they are the official acts of a sovereign state. Y. Dinstein, supra note 9, at 23-24. This
contention overlooks the subsequent developments at the Vienna Conference, at which
the conferees unanimously adopted a preamble to the Convention that its sponsors had
unambiguously stated expressed the functional necessity theory of immunity. See supra
notes 48-50 and accompanying text. This departure from pre-Convention theory illus-
trates the progressive development, in addition to the codification, of customary inter-
national law in the Vienna Convention.
106. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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in the receiving state.10 7 Moreover, the State Department has shown
little interest in encroaching on this function.108
III. APPLYING A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
A. The Functional Approach Defined
A functional approach to immunity questions requires examining
whether immunity for the act giving rise to suit is necessary for the
satisfactory and expedient performance of a recognized consular func-
tion.109 Article 5 is the source for determining whether a recognized
consular function is involved. In answering whether immunity for the
specific act in question is necessary for the performance of that func-
tion, it must be remembered that consular immunity is not intended to
benefit the individual. 110 Thus, the essence of the inquiry is not
whether the defendant consular officer deserves immunity solely because
he would have been unable, without the act, to perform the function,"'
107. The Provisional Draft Articles on Consular Intercourse and Immunities, pre-
pared by Zourek, contained a second paragraph in what is now article 43 that provided:
"Where a member of the consular staff invokes the above immunity.., all difficulties of
this kind must be settled solely through the diplomatic channel." U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.86 at 13 (1960), reprinted in [1960] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 37, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1960/Add.1. In the debate among ILC members over this provision, it
was argued that "[t]he interpretation of consular immunities and privileges should be
left to the courts of the receiving State." Summary Records of the Twelfth Session,
[1960] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 79, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1960 (statement of Mr.
Erim (Turkey)); see also id. at 78 (statement of Sir Fitzmaurice (United Kingdom)) ("It
[is] difficult to see how a country ... could accept the proposition that the mere fact of
immunity being invoked would prevent a court from pronouncing...."). The provision
was rejected eleven votes to two, with three abstentions. Id. at 79.
108. See 1978 Digest of United States Practice in International Law § 2, at 629-30.
[T]he Department [of State] regards itself as being in a position to give advice
to sending states concerning whether a particular activity qualifies as a recog-
nized consular function ....
Nevertheless, it is the Department's view that... it is only the trier of facts
which is in a position to make the determination as to the "official" nature of
the activity.
Id. at 630.
109. The reasoning in two pre-Convention cases illustrates the type of functional
approach advocated here. In Waltier v. Thomson, 189 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),
the court recognized that since it was the consular officer's duty to interview and advise
prospective immigrants, he enjoyed immunity from suit for an alleged misrepresentation
made in such an interview. Id. at 321. Implicit is the recognition that the opposite rule
could chill a consular officer's willingness to give advice.
In a French case, Judgment ofJan. 28, 1928, Cass. crim., Fr., 1928 Gazette du Palais
[G.P.] 726, translated and reprinted as Bigelow v. Princess Zizianoff in 23 Am.J. Int'l L.
172 (1929), the court held a consular officer amenable to a libel suit arising out of his
allegedly false reports to the press as to why a visa had been refused, because the report
was not the "necessary and indispensible corollary" of the consular function of granting
visas. Id. at 179.
110. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
111. TheJerez court appears to have followed this mistaken line of inquiry. It stated
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but whether the consular process would be impeded if consular officers
were amenable to the jurisdiction of the receiving state for such acts. 112
The functional approach effectuates the policy concerns evident in
the preparatory work and structure of the Convention by requiring an
inquiry into the significance of the act complained of to the relative
interests of the sending and receiving states. It also obviates any need
to draw on external sources of law, a common approach among courts
facing immunity questions. 113 This approach increases the likelihood
that different courts will reach different results in similar cases and that
decisions will rest on principles not well suited to the consular context.
B. The Functional Approach Applied
Application of the functional approach to administrative, civil, and
criminal actions demonstrates its utility as a basic method of answering
immunity questions. Such an approach resolves most of the interpre-
tive problems that arise and provides a framework for answering those
questions it cannot definitively resolve.
1. Immunity from Administrative Action. - Consider an administrative
action brought against a consular officer for violation of a law prohibit-
ing consular officers from obtaining provisional representation for
sending-state nationals before tribunals in the receiving state. Applica-
tion of the functional approach in this case will result in immunity.
This is so because the law overreaches permissible regulation of a
recognized consular function and threatens the exercise of an essen-
tial consular function: protecting the interests of sending-state na-
tionals. 114
The result would be different, however, if the consular officer had
violated a law requiring that representation before the receiving state's
tribunals be performed by a lawyer. He would be amenable to suit be-
cause the law implements a receiving state's legitimate interest in con-
trolling the qualifications of those who practice before its tribunals. 15
Moreover, because alternative means of obtaining representation re-
main available to the consular officer, the regulation does not
that since "Jerez's alleged wrongful conduct occurred in response to conduct which was
presently interfering with his ability to exercise his consular functions successfully ....
[he] was acting within the scope of his authority when the altercation occurred." Com-
monwealth v. Jerez, 390 Mass. 456, 463, 457 N.E.2d 1105, 1109 (1983).
112. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. Commentators have properly
focused on the process rather than the individual with regard to diplomatic immunity.
See Note, Diplomatic Immunity: A Proposal for Amending the Vienna Convention to
Deter Violent Criminal Acts, 5 B.U. Int'l LJ. 177, 210 & n.132 (1987).
113. See, e.g., Lyders v. Lund, 32 F.2d 308, 309 (N.D. Cal. 1929) (drawing analogy
between consular immunity and immunity of state officials under the eleventh amend-
ment); Commonwealth v.Jerez, 390 Mass. 456, 461-62, 457 N.E.2d 1105, 1108 (1983)
(supporting decision by reference to common-law agency principles).
114. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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unreasonably, and therefore impermissibly, interfere with an essential
function; consular officers can comply with the regulation and still safe-
guard the interests of sending-state nationals.
2. Immunity from Civil Suit. - Consider two civil suits arising from a
consular officer's denial of a visa to a prospective traveler to the send-
ing state: the first is based on the denial itself, the second on the consu-
lar officer's allegedly defamatory reports to the press concerning the
reasons for the denial. 116 Under article 5 of the Vienna Convention,
issuing visas to persons wishing to travel to the sending state is a recog-
nized consular function.1 17 Application of the functional approach will
result in immunity from the first suit,1 18 because immunity for denial of
a visa is essential if consular officers are to carry out that function free
of the intimidation and interference that exposure to such suits would
create. These effects could materially impair the sending state's ability
to monitor the influx of foreign travelers, a primary interest served by
this consular function. On the other hand, since the consular process
would suffer no deleterious effects if its officers were exposed to suit for
making defamatory reports to the press about visa denials, the func-
tional approach does not insulate the consular officer from the second
suit." 1 9 In the latter case, the interests of the receiving state in protect-
ing the reputations of its citizens outweigh the minimal interests of the
sending state in safeguarding the consular process from such
interference.
Immunity from civil suits based on contracts concluded by con-
sular officers involves a separate provision of article 43, which states
that the consular functions immunity rule shall not apply "in respect of
a civil action ... arising out of a contract concluded by a consular of-
ficer.., in which he did not contract expressly or impliedly as an agent
116. The facts of the second hypothetical are drawn from Judgment of Jan. 28,
1928, Cass. crim., Fr., 1928 G.P. 726, translated and reprinted as Bigelow v. Princess
Zizianoff, in 23 Am.J. Int'l L. 172 (1929).
117. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(d).
118. The Princess Zizianoff court recognized that the consular officer would have
been immune from suit based on the facts of the first hypothetical. SeeJudgment ofJan.
28, 1928, Cass. crim., Fr., 1928 G.P. at 729, translated and reprinted as Bigelow v. Prin-
cess Zizianoff in 23 Am.J. Int'l L. 172, 179 (1929).
119. The conclusion that consular officers do not generally enjoy immunity for tor-
tious conduct is supported by a recent holding in the Ninth Circuit that a consular em-
ployee (enjoying immunity equivalent to that of a consular officer under article 43) was
not immune from suit for allegedly tortious acts committed in connection with a resi-
dence rented by the Consulate for his use, because "no public interest or function of the
Consulate or [the sending state] was furthered by the allegedly tortious acts." See Jo-
seph v. Consulate General of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
56 U.S.L.W. 3590 (U.S. Feb. 29, 1988) (No. 87-1134).
Further support for this conclusion derives from the text of the Vienna Convention,
which declares the immunity rule inapplicable in civil actions arising out of traffic acci-
dents. See supra note 87. Since traffic accidents are an example of private activity ex-
posed to suit, it can be inferred that other tortious conduct falls outside the scope of
consular functions as well.
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of the sending State."' 120 The provision was added by an amendment
proposed by the United Kingdom utilizing the wording of its bilateral
consular conventions.121 This language, which suggests by negative
implication that contracting as an agent of the sending state is, without
more, sufficient to provide immunity from contract suits, 12 2 creates am-
biguities by implying a departure from the consular functions immunity
rule expressed in the first paragraph of article 43. However, this provi-
sion was added solely to ensure the protection of third parties 123 by
specifically excluding from immunity suits based on privately con-
cluded contracts.1 24 As such, it can be viewed as adding nothing to the
existing consular functions rule.'2 5 Thus, a reasonable interpretation
is that, as in pre-Convention cases,126 consular officers enjoy immunity
from suit for breach of contract solely where they have contracted in
the performance of consular functions. 127
Immunity from claims arising out of contracts concluded in the
course of consular duties is required to shield consular officers from the
threat of suit and financial liability that could seriously affect their per-
formance. As the activity on which the contract is based moves further
toward the periphery of recognized consular functions, 128 however, the
120. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 43, 2.
121. Nascimento e Silva, supra note 14, at 1227.
122. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
123. 1 Official Records, supra note 21, at 374 (statement of Mr. Evans (United
Kingdom)).
124. L. Lee, supra note 20, at 143.
125. See Nascimento e Silva, supra note 14, at 1227 ("One can reasonably say that
this provision was only included ex abundanti cautela, since paragraph 1 excludes immu-
nity for private action such as are [sic] expressly mentioned in paragraph 2."); see also S.
Exec. Doc. E, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1969) ("Consular officers are, like any private
party, subject to the jurisdiction of the receiving state with respect to their private acts.
This is emphasized by subparagraph 2(a) .... ").
126. Compare Landley v. Republic of Panama, 31 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1940)
(consular officer immune from suit for breach of promise to keep information on ser-
vices rendered by plaintiff to sending state confidential, because action was based on
duties performed as consul general) with Nashashibi v. Consul-Gen. of France (ordan,
Supreme Court of Cassation (1958)) (unpublished report No. 162/958), reprinted in 26
I.L.R. 190 (1958 II) (consular officer amenable to.suit for breach where he explictly
contracted as an agent of his government, because conclusion of contract was not a
consular act).
127. See Heaney v. Spain, 445 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1971) (consular officer contracted
as agent of sending state, yet court considered consular functions issue before finding
immunity); see also Joseph v. Consulate Gen. of Nigeria, No. C-84-6134 WHO (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 12, 1986) (although plaintiff dropped breach of contract claim, opinion indi-
cates that parties considered the consular functions rule to be controlling in immunity
determination, with no indication court viewed issue differently), aff'd, 830 F.2d 1018
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3590 (U.S. Feb. 29, 1988) (No. 87-1134).
128. See Heaney, 445 F.2d at 501 (consular officer concluded contract with United
States citizen to disseminate adverse publicity about another foreign government in




need to protect the consular process by finding immunity is less
compelling.
3. Immunity from Criminal Prosecution. - The balancing of sending-
and receiving-state interests that drives the functional approach works
to limit the scope of immunity in criminal cases such as Jerez. Illegal
acts, particularly those that are malum in se, are incompatible with the
exercise of consular functions 129 and seriously impinge on receiving-
state interests. Violence is not essential to the consular process; there-
fore, its officers do not need the protection of immunity for such acts in
order to carry out their functions. If the functional approach narrowly
circumscribes the scope of consular immunity from criminal prosecu-
tion for violent acts, it is to protect the receiving state against the worst
abuses of immunity.
130
In fact, there may never be cases in which otherwise criminal
conduct is immunized by the Vienna Convention. While the enforce-
ment of criminal laws may at times affect the manner in which a con-
sular officer performs his functions, the Vienna Convention protects
the consular process, not the individual.13 ' The consular process does
not require the execution of criminal acts. Therefore, amenability to
jurisdiction for such conduct is fully consistent with the functional ne-
cessity theory of immunity.
132
Nonetheless, there will be difficult cases in which it is unclear
whether receiving-state regulation will have a debilitating impact on an
essential function, or in which it is difficult to determine whether a rec-
ognized consular function is involved and the conflicting interests of
the sending and receiving states are evenly matched. However, the
functional approach should reduce the potential for inconsistent inter-
pretations by courts faced with immunity questions and increase the
degree of certainty in this aspect of consular relations by providing a
coherent standard by which consular conduct can be measured.
129. L. Lee, supra note 20, at 129; Note, supra note 44, at 673-74.
130. For an argument that the broad scope of diplomatic immunity should be
narrowed to exclude violent criminal conduct in order to curb abuses, see Note, supra
note 112, at 203-07.
131. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text. Arguably, a pattern of false
accusations of even minor crimes could interfere with the consular process. Only com-
plete criminal immunity, however, could foreclose this threat; yet the Vienna Conven-
tion does not provide such broad immunity. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
The likelihood of this type of threat to the process is small and can be addressed by the
more tailored remedy of providing broader immunity on the bilateral level. See supra
note 15.
132. In addition, the preparatory work of the Vienna Convention supports the con-
clusion that amenability to the jurisdiction of the receiving state for lesser criminal of-
fenses was contemplated by the drafters. See supra note 82. Moreover, the Vienna
Convention provides safeguards against such exposure becoming an unwarranted hin-
drance to consular functions. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
1988]
862 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:841
CONCLUSION
Prior interpretations of the Vienna Convention have left the scope
of consular immunity uncertain. However, the text, preparatory work,
and structure of the Vienna Convention show that consular immunity
derives from its functional necessity and is delimited in scope by bal-
ancing competing sending- and receiving-state interests. A functional
approach to immunity questions can resolve most interpretive
problems and provide a framework for answering those questions it
cannot definitively resolve.
CurtisJ. Milhaupt
